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Abstract:  In this paper we attempt to argue that the pursuit of socialist objectives as enshrined in the constitution of the United Republic holds a lofty promise for building a national consensus over development priorities within the timeframe of vision 2025. The choice is not between socialism or capitalism but rather to struggle for modernization of our productive capacities, delivery of quality social services and equitable access to resources.

INTRODUCTION: POSING THE PROBLEM
In 1992 Tanzania reverted to a multi-party political system she had literately abandoned since the consummation of the union in 1964. The decision was reached after intense discussion and consultations among different stakeholders that started sometime towards the end of the 1980 in response to changes in the correlation of class forces within the country as well as changes in geo-political alignments in the external socio-political environment (Pateman, 1985; Deuch, 1974; Mbwiliza, 2004; Msambachime & Rugalabamu, 1998; ). In the course of the debate the words political pluralism and multi-partyism tended to be used interchangeably and this lack of clarity greatly influenced the outcome as evidence in the legislation which followed (Mbwiliza, 2002). 

Though not concerned with this essay, let us take note that whereas in Tanzania, formation of political parties is regulated by law and is conditional upon the fulfilment of certain requirement, in Mauritius and Zimbabwe for example, the right to form political parties is seen as a right derivable from the constitutional right of association. Political association is thus governed by common law while official recognition is relevant in connection with the conduct of elections (Mmuya and Chaliga, 1992; Othman, Bavu & Okema, 1990; Duverger, 1963).

 The decision that Tanzania should revert to a multi-party political system as the avenue for further deepening democracy within the country was received with enthusiasm among reform activists, most whom were a few urban based intellectuals,  members of professional associations especially lawyers and those who had scores to settle with the ruling party. Indeed this is why the Nyalali Commission reported that if numbers were to decide the winner, those who had expressed their disagreement with a return to multi-party politics, 80% the respondents, would have curried the day. But politics is not about numbers only, the 20% who had expressed preference to milt -party political system won by force of argument after factoring in both internal and external factors. 
Although the question of socialism had been raised as far back as the mid-1980s as part of a general discussion on the impact of Structural Adjustment Programmes and other policy frameworks proposed by the Britton Woods institutions as remedies to a deteriorating economic situation not only in Tanzania but in much of sub-Saharan Africa, the issue of socialism either as a political ideology did not constitute itself as an integral part of the reform agenda. True, within the larger society there were especially again in urban and peril-urban centres, a significant section of the population who had come to associate the national economic downturn with the policy of socialism and self-reliance. The facts do not support this claim since by the time Tanzania reached agreement with the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund the twin policy objectives had seriously been undermined as Mwongozo of 1981 was to admit (Msekwa, 1995; URT, 1992; Aldrich, 1995). On the other hand, there were those whose concerns were on the fate of the struggle for socialism as enshrined in the Arusha Declaration, should Structural Adjustment programmes succeed in their overall objectives since these were, in both their motive and intent, the antithesis of socialist goals this debate for or against socialism gathered momentum and was given intellectual and theoretical legitimacy by occasional references to the reforms which were taking place in the Soviet Union under Perestroika and glasnost between 2988 and 1989 and the aftermath of those reforms in  the turmoil’s which engulfed Eastern Europe early in 1990s.

Within this changed internal and external socio-political environment, CCM read correctly the signs of the moment and braced up to face the challenges ahead. There was no viable alternative to political reform if the country was to be spared from the consequences of a mismanaged transition from single to multi- party political system. Thus the party became more and more pragmatic in its political orientation and more accommodating in its world outlook baling   in mind its own heterogeneous social composition that was is emerging out   of the reform process. Although this pragmatic approach to politics has been labeled by some as ideological back pedaling, I find no contradiction between a political objective of building a national consensus around a shared vision of a society based on the principles of democracy and social justices (Nyalali, 1992; Kisanga, 1995; URT, 1977; Liundi, 1998). In fact this vision was what was envisaged in the constitutional arrangement which entrenched a Bill of Right in 1984 (URT, 1984).

 Under article 9 of the constitution the permit of socialism and self-reliance is presented as a means to facilitate the building of the united Republic as a nation of equal and free individuals enjoying freedom justice, fraternity and concord (URT, 1984). Wherein socialist principles are upheld their application are required to take cognizance of condition prevailing in the united Republic to leave no room for universal dogmas (URT, 1984; FES, 1991; ESAURP,1998 ). Indeed the provisions under article 23 (i) of the constitution articulate the cardinal principle of socialism: form each according to his ability, to each according to his contribution, while given the specific conditions  of  Tanzania both in terms of  the country’s history and  couture, venous forms of property ownership are given constitutional recognition  (Alawi, 1979; Mbwiliza, 1999; Deane, 1955; Cole, 1920). 
Given this constitutional and legislative framework the debate over socialism as a means to a long term society goal seems to me to be rather misplaced and unwarranted, A socialism so defined by the country’s constitution cannot be a source of potential disagreement or conflict within the country although afferent people may differ as to method of realizing the ideal society envisaged in Vision 2025. 

Secondary since where is already a national vision that was in fact arrived as through a long process of bargaining and condense building I fail to understand the logic behind demands that write a new national vision to guide  our new resolve and determination to move the nation forward towards a prosperous and just society under the banner of Ari Mpya, Nguvu Mpya, na Kasi Mpya, Maisha bora kwa kila Mtanzania.

It is that vision that has to be owned by all Tanzania in order to protect it from being privately appropriated. We need a national vision yes. That vision exists already. The National Economic Growth and Poverty Reduction strategy provides the strategy and tactics to work to wards that envisioned society of 2025 Within CCM that vision is discernible in Mwelekeo  wa Sera za Uchumi katika Miaka ya 2000-2010 while the  party’s manifesto 2005-2010 sets  out priority areas to be addressed  in the short and medium term.

The current discourse on democracy and governance in Africa reveals in a large measure the limited scope of our conception of politics in our troubled continent. Concepts are thrown around while politics is admittedly a contestation for the exercise of power; it seems to be left without a purpose. And yet there must be a purpose for   which people in their right senses are prepared to stake their   lives and fortunes in the struggle for democracy and good governance. The link between the means and ends seems to be missing .This inevitably turns the struggle for democracy to be an end in itself. To be purposeful, the struggle for democracy must be linked with the search for appropriate political institutional modalities and structures that would facilitate African countries to realize higher ideals of equity and soil economic trans- formation. That is why popular participation must occupy centre-stage in any discourse on democracy and governance. It is indisputable that the long-term objective requires embracing the principles and practices of democracy taken as a whole (Magid, 1941; Rivkin, 1968; Nyerere, 1968; Nyerere, 1969).

Unfortunately, these principles and practices of democracy almost invariably have been interpreted to mean the institutionalization of party politics. Form not content takes centre stage. While democracy is inconceivable under conditions of constrained participation, and the politics of exclusion, it remains arguable whether the party form is the most appropriate and necessary condition for the practice of democracy (Hsiao, 1927; Maggid, 1941).The argument is obviously flawed and yes it is one on which the model of an ideal African democracy has been built (Kusin, 1971; Golan, 1971). It is because we in Tanzania embraced this model uncritically that we opened wide the floodgates of the proliferation of political and quasi political parties (Schumpeter, 1976; Seymour, 1991). Our emphasis on political parties as the only political modality gave birth to a legislation which canonized the model and sent an unintended message across society. The provisions of the law laid down conditions for registration which were glaringly in favour of proliferation of political parties and to cap it all with the promise of receiving regular subventions from the government (Bagenda, 1991).

Our obsession with political parties is obviously a resent of our cultural and integrities upbringing which has made as more as home with the political histories of Western Europe and the united states. But even then a closer examination will reveal that we have not been able to learn the dynamics in the political processes which propelled these to political multipartysm. We seek the ideal in the western European or transatlantic democratic tradition but lack a sufficient understanding of its history. We are apt to believe American democracy has been as we see it today since the founding of the union in 1776 or even later after the civil war in 1865. We clamor for liberal democracy but fail to make a distinction between laissez-faire liberalism of John Stuart Mill with its emphasis on individual liberties from welfare-state liberalism of the twentieth century. Devoid of conceptual clarity the struggle for democracy in Africa has been a wholesale importation of finished democratic models which by and large have proved to be square-pags in round holes when confronted with our own African realities (Mbwiliza, 2004).

In Tanzania many of the reform activists are agreed on the need for institutional reform. There are differences however on how constitution reform is to be organized and achieved some preferring a piecemeal approach through constitution amendments through parliament while others would prefer a radical break with the past and write a now constitution to be passed by a Constitutional Assembly. Details in each of the positions falls outside the scope of this paper, but it is sad that rather than broadening the scope of the argument the tendency has been to foreclose the debate (OAU, 1979; OAU, 1979).

Indeed one of the issues which have not featured in discussions in each of the contending sides is the question of the socio-political context within which political reforms are to take place and the social goats they are intended to achieve. The present constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania has one of its declared objectives; the building of a socialist society. It states, inter alia that all political and administrative activities will be guided by the pursuit of objectives enshrined in the policy of socialism and self-reliance (World Bank, 1981). This institutional provision in my view provides a politico-juridical context within which the reform agenda is to be pursued. None of the political parties registered so far has come up strongly to articulate political options and social goals which take this constitutional framework as its defense and starting point.  Had this constitutional provision been taken seriously in the legislation that emanates from it   emanates from it, few of the parties would have passed the test for registration. Instead the parties now have taken refuge behind the courts for decisions, itself a commendable and welcome development which demonstrates maturity and civility rather than the more populist sensationalized rallies and demonstrations. The struggle for constitutional reform however cannot be left to periodic intervention of the courts of law. Neither would it be in the long-term interest of our country to consider the reform agenda as the preserve of lawyers least of all the Attorney General’s Chambers (OAU, 1989a, 1989b, 1989c).

 The struggle for democracy is about the reordering of relationships between the state and society in a given polity. A discussion of the struggle has therefore inevitably to carry with it the question of the guiding ideology of the struggle. It is absolutely legitimate to ask questions about social ends a particular struggle is intended to achieve. And this is no small issues given the heterogeneity of the political parties, class relations within civil society and our country’s dependent relations within a global economic and political environment dominated by multi lateral imperialism. Elections however democratic will for the above reasons give us a state whose autonomy is curtailed and its range of options limited (Bagenda & Mwambungu, 1990). Theoretical and conceptual clarity are therefore important weapons both for strategic as well us tactical reasons. A narrow theoretical framework will lead us into a minimalist definition of democracy which places emphasis on forms of democracy instead of the content of democracy or by reducing popular participation in elections as an end in itself. In order to make the struggle for democracy purposeful there must be an articulation between straggle for social ends and struggle for participation.   

When democracy is about party politics and participation has been reduced to voter turnout on Election Day, it comes as no surprise that political parties lose their sense   of purpose and vision. In some cases some of the patties have been unceremoniously declared dead soon after elections because there is nothing left for them to do. Herein lies the limitation of the American conception of political parties and their role in a political community.

In Third world countries political parties have to define their political programmes which go beyond winning elections and obtaining majorities in national and local legislatures. They   must continually agitate among the masses participating with their rank and file given support where necessary to the development initiatives being taken at local level.  This is true for ruling patties in opposition. In any case in most third world counties the difference between policies advocated by each of the parties is rather thin in terms of choice. And there is yet inherent danger in a framework where the avenues of meaningful participation is by law through political parties. This in itself tends to fore close the possibility of a more inclusive and broad based framework which is capable of bringing in other forms of social organizations within civil society into the political process. Human nature being what it is, we should not underrate the capacity of the political domain to impose itself on civil society organizations thus gradually encroaching on their autonomy through on outright intimidation, bribery, recruitment or cooptation.

(iii) Multi-partisan or pluralist politics?
So much for this long but necessary digression Our main concern in this pepper is not on democracy per se but rather on the prospect of building a national consensus around a one longterm objective of building a socialist Tanzania as provided for and elaborated under paragraph (9) of the constitution (URT, 1977) .We are indeed cognizant of the fact that the process of democratization taking place within the country was initiated and shaped by the interplay of both internal and external factors. Indeed at may be argued that the driving force in the struggle for democracy throughout much of Africa has been a correlation of class forces within a specific social formation as  well as the interplay of the dynamics within the external environment to wit the forces of globalization. Though not the cause, the collapse of the communist regimes of Eastern Europe and disintegration of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia which followed, together with the impact of structural adjustment programmes promoted and funded by the World Bank and International Monetary Fund have had a special significance in their contribution to the acceleration of and the timing of the struggle for democracy and political restructuring. 

Although structural adjustment programmes persued in Tanzania between 1986 and 1994 had greater impact on the alignment of class forces within, it is on the collapse of the socialist regimes that much literature has focused and this is not by sheet accident. One of the reasons why the collapse of the socialist regimes of Eastern Europe should be dramatized is the unstated objective of demonstrating to the uninitiated that socialism is incompatible with democracy. The collapse of the regimes was not because of internal decay but rather because of the appeal and central- petal forces inherent in bourgeois western democracies (Business Times 9.5.1991). The same argument carries with it a corollary that political reforms cannot be undertaken within a socialist regime. Implied is a suggestion that socialism however defined must be abandoned in favour of free market capitalism (Maggid, 1941; Nicollas, 1975; Glass, 1966; Banard, 1972). The impotence of this lies in the fact that there was in Africa an assortment of African leaders who for different political policy objectives had imbibed doses   communist political and economic   practices which acted as beacons in their own political and economic development programmes. Needless to say that some had actually leaned the wrong lessons and woaned probably have required a rereading of Lenin’s Testament, or Trotsky, The Revolution Betrayed’ (Banard & Vernon, 1976)

(iv)	A Case for Socialist pluralism and Nyerere’s political vision 
Nyerere commitment to one me-party rule in must be conceded was not ideological but rather a pragmatic. He had in his address to the students and faculty of Wellesley College in Boston in 1960 when he spoke on among other issues the prospects and challenges of democracy in Africa (Banard & Vernon, 1976). By 1990 he had already come to the conclusions that political reforms which embraced the notion of political pluralism  were inevitable  in Tanzania. He however never entertained the view that such reforms would entail abandoning the policy of socialism and self-reliance. To him the two constituted a set of values and ideals to be struggled for irrespective of party ideologies and political modalities which come out of the   political reform process. This is to say he saw in socialism and self reliance the building blocks of a  post-independence national ethic around which a national consensus could be  galvanized (Banard & Vernon, 1976). In this he remained closer to the positions held by English socialists as much as he was to Alexander Dubcek in Czechoslovakia and his pluralist socialists in central Europe. He underscored this viewpoint in his introductory remarks when he launched the debate an political reform in Tanzania  in February 1990 at a press in conference in Dar-es-salaam and June of the same year when he address a congress of the Youth League of Chama Cha Mapindunzi in Mwanza (Deane, 1955). He was betrayed?. As the debate gathered momentum it brought on board elements which read the Arusha Declaration through ideological lenses (Dahl, 1970). Despite its wide grassroots popularity the policy of socialism and self- reliance was to be put on the cross or to play it safe by making no reference to it for obvious opportunistic reasons aimed at turning that important policy document into a non-issue. It is to his credit that although he was no linger at the helm, his force of argument made in possible for the retention in the constitution a provision that would have been an early casualty of constitutional and political reform.  

English socialist pluralists of the early twentieth century before and between the two world wars had viewed socialism as an order in which maximum autonomy of social and economic functions coexiststed with a minimum of political functions.  On the other hand, Czech reformers of the 1960 viewed such autonomy as realizable only in conjunction with effective political modalities. To them the political legalization of socialist regimes did not entail the diminished role of the state but rather its invigoration as a space for contesting general ends (Galtung, 1969; 1975). However, socialist pluralism as posited by both Laske and Cole and the pluralizing efforts of central European reformers contained within themselves an uncomfortable contradiction within pluralism and socialism This uncomfortable contradiction lay in  the  two positions  identification with  the political processes of liberal democratic societies to an extent that the very notion of pluralism within the context  of the struggle for socialism appeared paradoxical if not theoretically untenable. Both views found themselves at loggerheads with the main powerful trends in socialist thought, mainly Stalinism and Fabian socialism. They had nothing to lean on from classcal Marxism which could support the claim for a more pluralist social order. 

In my view it appears Tanzania reformers were caught in the same trap by formulating the reform agenda in a manner that not only confuses form and content but also fails to make a correct distinction between issues which belong to realm of politics from those that are of an ideo-juridical nature. In so doing they avoided any sustained interest in discussions of democracy and its organizational forms beyond political parties (Laski, 1968; Duguit, 1919). Such a debate if would have generated ideas on forms of popular participation and the relationship between state and society that would not block the struggle for socialism as a national ideal.

By formulating the reform agenda as purely a political equation, it became inescapable to pose the question of socialism as simply an ideological question. Hence it was argued, that the socialist objectives enshrined under paragraph 9 (a-x) of the Union constitution were incompatible with a social  order that was envisioned under political pluralism (Laski, 1968) .Thus the struggle for pluralist democracy became as it were concomitantly a struggle against socialism. Had this seceded, it would have meant the elimination of all references in the constitution to socialism as a national social goal thus delivering a knockout punch to the struggles of the working masses for whom the entrenchment of the question of socialism into the constitution was one the most significant gains since the Arusha Declaration. But could the question have been posed differently? Yes, indeed. One   way of addressing the problem would have been to start by questioning the definitional linkage between pluralism and economic competition, pluralism and social differentiation and between socialism and political consensus. On this subject we shall rely on Banard and Vernon in their celebrated article on socialist pluralism for an elaboration (Laski, 1968; Duguit, 1919) . They distinguish socialist pluralism from pluralist socialism as follows:

 “By socialist pluralism we understand a phase or a vision of society on which a pattern of social and economic differentiation is linked with socialist principles but in which the meaning of socialism is not raised as a question By pluralist socialism in contrast we understand a situation or conception of society in which socialism is found in need of political differentiation (Proudhon, 1923).”

In contrasting the two approaches to political pluralization Barnard and Vernon underscore the fact that the political dimension which distinguishes them ought not to be reduced to patterns of social differentiation or drawn from models of market competition (Cole,1919; Pateman, 1970). In their opinion they argue, that by raising the meaning of socialism as a political question, socialist pluralists put into the foreground what pluralist socialists deny, that is the distinctiveness of the state as a sphere of general social goals and the role of politics as a forum for public contestation of these goals. In the final analysis we are in fact proposing a far more radical transformation of the manner in which not only politics is conceived but also the notion of unity and diversity while at the same time presenting the political as not only sui generis but also as a negation of the belief that consensus on fundamental principles or values restricts the range of diversity to non-political, non-ideological; in short to pragmatism.

Socialism as a social goal is an ideal that is worth struggling for; however there are many roads to its attainment. The discussion in the preceding paragraphs has shown that within pluralism there exist different schools of thought. Even within one school there may be differences on how pluralism is perceived and understood. The English school of socialist pluralism was for example a complex phenomenon which defied simple explanations (Cole, 1919). So it was among socialist reformers in Central and Eastern Europe. Czech reformers differed in their perception of pluralist socialism with their Yugoslav reformers. Our interest in opting for the two schools out of a diversity of schools is made out of consideration of both their similarities and differences in their presentation of plurality within a socialist context. The question raised provide insights into our own situation although we may not all agree with the answers Bernard and Vernon propose.

ENGLISH SOCIALIST PLURALISM
English pluralists did not attempt to sweep under the carpet the existence of conflict in their immediate communities as well as in the larger community. Indeed they were even aware of the possibility of conflict surfacing between principles and interests. These possibilities however did not contain an envisaged political confrontation between agencies such as political parties which represented principled party positions or a constellation of interests seeking to secure authoritative enforcement of their demands. Nor did they associate conflict with plurality as we so often do. Their conception of plurality included proposals for segregating areas of concern within distinct autonomies in order to drastically reduce the tendency to seek authoritative enforcement of group interests. Pluralism here became a means to curtail the incidence of conflicts by providing, in the words of Robert Dahl, mutual guarantees and consensus associations (Banard & Vernon, 1976; Pateman, 1970)

By guaranteeing the autonomy of major social and economic groups and thus reserving many or most issues to specialized functional constituencies in which there  was a high possibility of agreement, English pluralists sought to place some important matters beyond the scope of public-decision-making . Confrontation or recourse to the use of public authority therefore, would become not only less frequent but also, less necessary as a scope of public enactment narrowed. Their concern was not with the question of the mode of access to public authority but with how to curtail its range. This stance was to an extent reflective of the influence of legal as opposed to political interests from which much of pluralist thinking grew (Banard & Vernon, 1976)

The jurisprudential concerns of the pluralist school extended far beyond the question of the legal status of economic associations. Both Laski and Cole’s proposals on economic organizations represent a special application of some doctrines of jury prudence concerning associations in general. The central thrust of these doctrines lay in a challenge to the “concession” theory of corporations which presented institutions as creatures of sovereign legal enactments (Lifton, 1970; Lifton, 1963).  On the contrary these institutions were seen to be no less primary than the state since law itself was not an imperative expression of public authority but emerged from the interplay of social forces (Nyerere, 1968; 1978).    Consequently it might be tempting to envisage a pluralist order of corporate authority wherein authority is parcellized among various institutions, that is no longer concentrated at a single centre. The influence of Rousseau and other considerations apart, these jurisprudential formulations reflect the pluralist vision of socialism, taken to mean devolution of authority to autonomous associations each responsible for the management of common affairs within their respective domains. Inter group relations would accordingly be handled by processes of negotiations held within legal constraints as provided for constitutionally.

This legal matrix of pluralism is what sets English pluralists apart from other pluralists within the socialist tradition where no such emphasis on the rule of law is discernible. But they all converge with the mainstream of socialist pluralist thought in two major respects; their vision of autonomous associations tied together by relations of mutual exchange and secondly, their low premium attached to political action which makes them firm allies of classical Marxism and anarchist strands of pluralism in a socialist order. Thus the authoritarian tendencies which manifested themselves within those states in Africa which opted for socialism and the absence of overt political action and expression within socialist regimes in Eastern Europe beg a different explanation beyond an inherited jurisprudential construct. English pluralists were sensitive to the questions of legal freedoms so much so that their formulations amounted to a proposal to separate the legal order from political power and in fact as a corollary to subject governments to legal restraint.

“The rule of law is clearly independent of the state, and indeed anterior to it.
It is imposed upon public persons, even More than on private individuals “(Laski, 1968; Duguit, 1919).

Although the state was to serve as the organ by which the transfer of power was to be affected, it was to shed rapidly its hegemonic status and authority in favour of self-governing associations whose freedom was a necessary condition of socialism. The reasons for the diminished role of public conflict are not therefore to be sought in any curtailment of freedom of expression but rather in the absence of any political location within which confrontation over general ends could occur.

We have already stated above that inter group relations were to be managed by processes of negotiation and bargaining. Vertical relations of power were to give way to horizontal relations of adjustment, compromise and exchange. This proposal which is close to the heart of the English school of pluralism recalls in broad outlines theories of socialist anarchism exemplified by Prouhon who saw the socialist order as one in which “polity” would have been absorbed by “economy” (Nyerere, 1968; 1978). Such a fundamentally economic paradigm of social order necessarily tends towards an apolitical direction. For if economic relations are taken as a model, decisions will be made by processes of mutual adjustments among actors who must take as given the validity of one another’s claims. What is specific to the political relations however is precisely the possibility of contesting some claims in the light of others which are held by those who propose them to have an overriding significance. And such situations by their very nature are not amenable to the model of horse trading because what is at stake is confrontation and not exchange.

Political competition rests on the assumption that the ensemble of relations in a society may be modified by political authority and that the ends which authority is to serve are a matter of dispute. By contrast the social ensemble in a given economic context is not a subject of contestation over authoritative ordering of claims and ends, for strictly speaking it is nothing more than the interactive outcome of reciprocal contracts and exchange. This literally cancels out the necessity of contested claims over general ends but in so doing the English socialist pluralists left not enough space for the role of political institutions to meet such ends. Not surprisingly their theories paralled more closely the economic rather than the political model of diversity, amounting in effect to the notion of stateless society. 

The focus of activities which Laski and Cole described as “political” lay within “society” itself that is within the self-governing economic associations that the pluralists wished to see. The vestigial public government was not seen as a focus for public debate over contested general ends. Government was usually seen as an institution at par with other associations differing only in that its basis was “territorial” rather than “functional.” As a territorial association, it was argued, governments proper role was to satisfy those needs which people have by virtue of living within prescribed territorial boundaries (Tocqueville, 1961).  However these needs may have been contemplated there is no doubt that government was being reduced to an ephemeral institution when it came to the necessity to intervene in situations where people’s needs diverged.

The logical extension of this was that it was within the social and economic associations that democratic values could be more effectively realized. For one thing, citizens would be able to participate in all those diverse “co-ordinate” spheres of activity which concerned them most and would no longer be confined to casting their votes to a candidate far removed from his interests. Secondary, it was claimed that effective representation was possible only on the basis of functionally defined constituencies because a homogeneous group of electors would be able to exercise for more control over their representatives by effectively reducing them to the role of delegates with their tasks clearly defined by their constituents. 

The argument may appear to contain within itself some claw back implications in that what is given by one hand is taken away with another. For, although members of a functional constituency are given the opportunity to participate with a far higher frequency and in a variety of social and economic issues, there is no longer anything of substance “politically” to participate in Thus Cole went so far as to fore- close discussion on the notion of political representation by arguing that a person cannot be represented (Dictionary of Philosophy).  On the surface, this may be correct but to say that people can be represented only in some specified aggregates such as workers, peasants, and consumers or as members of professional associations is probably to overstretch the argument. If a person cannot be represented it means he cannot be represented, period. It is hardly convincing that a facet of that some person can be represented. What can be represented however is a position or a principle for which you need to group the context of general issues to which divergent responses are possible. So much with English socialist pluralism, we now turn to examine the position and political implications of pluralist socialism.

The pluralist socialist variant in Central Europe 
Central and Eastern European reformers did not contemplate a serious challenge to their model of reformed socialism. This unquestioning faith in a monolithic political belief system is what has led to a culture of political intolerance and mind reform programmes on the one hand  and a source of violations or denial  of civil and political rights on the other. As Barnard and Vernon have suggested, the notion of an ineluctable link between the comprehensive and total character of a belief system and a closed or authoritarian political control system is a dubious one (Bagenda & Jonathan (n.d); Seymour, 1959; Downs, 1957). The notion of a necessary linkage between the two rests on a conflation of what ought to be kept conceptually separate. Political conflict is by no means inconceivable within any given belief system so that authoritarian political institutions are not a sure guarantee of its own immortality, that is its capacity to continually reproduce itself in both time and space Kusin, 1971; Golan, 1973).  But this is again dependent on whether the basis of commitment to that particular belief system emanates from reasoned justification; from an internalized rational sanction which invokes the content rather than the source of the belief system (Msekwa, 1995). Where sanction is rational, limited to content as opposed to the source of the belief system, then this provides an opportunity for both flexibility and enhanced capacity for regeneration.  If becomes more accommodating to both external and internal challenges because it is more open. The contrast to this is an authoritarian regime, a closed political order which can only be sustained genetically by an appeal to the source, to tradition and revelation or recourse to state sponsored violence. What is at stake here is the modus operandi of the belief system rather than its form or character, since the political meaning of a belief system requires continuous elaborations relating the creed to a concrete purpose. Such definitions must establish at least; (a) the overall bearing of the general principles upon the situation at hand (b) the specific per formative principles from which concrete action is to issue.

We have so far avoided the use of the term “ideology “ in preference to “belief-system” because of the imprecise way “ideology” is currently being used in political discourse. It is not always clear about what is intended when one speaks of a party “ideology” or its “philosophy” let alone that the two are used interchangeably. Ideology will be used more sparingly and limited to general principles which are employed by political parties and movements to identify themselves or differentiate themselves from others as district organizations and by means of which they explain and justify their political activities, attempt to gain support and or to challenge their opponents (Dahl, 1971; Deng and William, 1991; Gurr, 1993; Musambachime, 1992). Political ideology thus understood in this limited sense need not be thought of as being synonymous with a broad world view Germans would refer to as constituting weltanschauung (Dahl, 1971; Deng and William, 1991; Gurr, 1993; Musambachime, 1992). There is neither any logical or empirical ground upon which we can rely to dismiss a possibility for such a broad belief system to contain within itself a capacity to accommodate more than one political party or movement thus allowing for internal ideological differentiation and pluralization.

This proposal  runs contrary to Marxist dialectics, the principle of negation, by which opposing tendencies within a given system generate their own negation in an ontological sense. What is proposed here is a possible continuous co-existence of rival alternatives which strictly speaking are not opposites. It is precisely this notion of non-ontological conflict which characterizes the paradigm of institutionalized political competition within a general belief system and which marks it off from the revolutionary strife characteristic of closed belief systems.  

It might be tempting, to regard such internal differentiation merely as a divergence over means to an end and hence for that reason alone to regard such divergence as being les significant. This certainly would be misleading because where two groups differ over the bearing of their shared beliefs upon a particular situation or issue, then the differences are broader and significant than they may appear to be on the surface. It is a difference over the overall framework of the belief system as a whole, and if an “end” is understood to mean something that can be practically attained, then such differences apparently ideological are differences over ends though these ends may be expressed in a shared vocabulary. They should not be trivialized because the intensity of political conflict is not simply a function of the doctrinal distance between the conflicting parties

The apparent convergence of affirmation of ideology, as exemplified by the switch-over from one party to another, from republicanism to democrats from Labourites to conservatives or craftiest of all tendencies, could be a reflection of fluidity in terms of class relations within a given polity. It is something of interest that political pluralism gained currency in Britain soon after the emergence of a socialist alternative to the capitalist system. And again the search for a model of socialism that would fit the specific historical ad multi-ethnic and multi –cultural circumstance s of Central and Eastern Europe became more intense in Czechoslovakia daring the 1960s. We would not however like to give economic conditions a determinant causal role as regards political pluralism however significant, because a functional requirement may not necessarily constitute itself into an essential determinant. 46 Even in the case of under developed economies and especially in those “failed” socialist regimes in Africa in which economic power was inextricably tied up with political power through the state-ownership of the commanding heights of the economy, and in which social interests are intertwined with national interests through the overlap of party and state, there is a discernible link between economy and politics. Under such conditions there may be pay-offs to be gained through the introduction of plural checks and controls beyond mere separation of powers. But these controls are functional requirements. By themselves they do not constitute casual determinants of political pluralism.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA
As noted above, proposals to pluralize the socialist system in Czechoslovakia gained intensity early in the 1960s. The reform agenda anchored around three pillars; “Constitutionalism”  “Parliamentary” and multi-partyism. In their totality the three fronts of the reform agenda amounted to a radical reappraisal of the basis of relations between state and society under socialism. These however were not new proposals because at the rise of the reform movement, Czechoslovakia had already a constitution, a parliament and at a formal level was politically multi-party. The changes that were being proposed did not amount to new conditions to an existing order but rather were for the better operationalisation of what already existed in space. The reformers were therefore not agitating for “more” but for “better”. Theirs was a call for a transition from a monolithic political system to a pluralism which involved a change that would bring about qualitative changes and cumulatively alter the very texture of socialist life.

Czechoslovakia obtained its socialist constitution in 1960.  Under this constitution the Communist Party was granted the right to political leadership as a juridical requirement of Czechoslovakia’s statehood. It thus not only legalized the identification of the party with nation but also institutionalized the permanent monopoly of power by a political party. The constitution thus rendered guarantees and controls unnecessary as it vitiated the very notion of political pluralism. It was under this constitution that the Communist party became the legally recognized guardian of the rights and interests of all the Czechs and Slovaks and before long it took upon itself the responsibility to determine by virtue of its “leading role” the outcome of elections when such elections were permitted. Consequently free and fair elections let alone competitive political parties could not dislodge it from its constitutionally entrenched monopoly of the exercise of power, unless therefore, this constitutional provision was dropped no electoral, parliamentary or party reforms could alter the political basis of a system in which the ruling party was constitutionally shielded from political confrontation.

Constitutionalism thus featured not merely as the juridical basis for pluralist socialism but also as a means to a shared societal ethos or culture. An enlarged area of freedom for the expression of differences required a deepened recognition of and respect for differences. The viability of the reform proposals for pluralist socialism rested ultimately on a shared vision of acceptable boundaries of political confrontation between what was desirable and that which was possible as well as on the methodology to be employed. In short, this meant that through constitutionalism the reformers aimed at creating a shared sense of political civility in addition to providing structural legal frameworks for political pluralism.

Their proposals had far-reaching implications for the very conception of democracy and its operationalisation. Hither to the officially sanctioned doctrine verged on the principle of direct democracy. The ruling party through its organs laid the general guidelines, the rest being left to the executive organs of the state and party functionaries at all levels. In descending order respective organs interpreted the directives and policies handed down to them in accordance with local conditions. Policies were thus to be the outcome of horizontal processes as much as they were of vertical modes of transmission. 

 The pluralist response was to change this form of direct democracy. They did not dispute the concept of direct democracy but rather its command structure because as a principle of general ends, it was in line with such other forms of democratic practices such as workers committees, and associations of producers held deadly and   were closer to the heart of some of the reformers. Nevertheless some maintained serious reservations about extending the principle of direct democracy to political activity at state level at which they wanted to see an effective system of representation in the form of a invigorated parliament.

While to orthodox communists the demand for a return to parliamentary democracy may appear paradoxical, to the reformers this was tenable and prudent. They argued that it was imprudent to think of parliament solely in terms of the struggle for socialism and not in terms of its own subsequent supremacy. It was imprudent, so they argued, because the gaining of power is so closely identified with the attainment of a social goal of socialism, which is an apolitical system because it was transitional to classless communist destination, parliamentary institutions would be rendered dispensable, Such linkage implied that socialist power holders were not in need of being checked or even replaced in the same way that power holders in non-socialist democratic regimes are held accountable, replaced or controlled.     
     
The confrontation of beliefs and interests aimed at seeking a restraint on power as well as serving as a means to secure a majority at any given time which would embody the supreme will of the state. Parliament not the party would provide the authoritative link between society and state, a link that had been usurped by the Communist party under the monolithic system. whose price was the emergence of   disarticulation between the base and superstructure of society and the virtual absorption of parliament by the party (Bulmer, 1953; Duverger, 1962).

This conception of majoritarian pluralism staked no claim to a moral righteousness on behalf of the supreme will of the state but rather it was anticipated that majority decisions would be a working method, a modus operandi of combining confrontation with cooperation, a civilized way of resolving dispute where unanimity was unattainable (Dahl, 1971; Deng and William, 1991; Gurr, 1993; Musambachime, 1992). What is of crucial importance in the reform scheme is the emphasis on public contestation as a means of eliciting majorities, a clear departure from the model of a democratic centralist single party in which differences are assumed to be merely temporary, and capable of resolution within the party and not publicly by majority decisions.

There was an underlying assumption here that majorities and minorities could alternate periodically and that processes of differentiation and aggregation would invariably produce a majority. Such assumptions were not based on any firm criteria or empirical evidence. The fact remains however that there has yet to be invented a better political system and method of coming to terms with conflicting positions without recourse to violence.

What the Czech reformers are proposing does not amount to a rehabilitation of the old model of representation but rather a qualitative ear into a new system of representative democracy befitting the new challenges and circumstances. They are not contented with an appeal to institutionalization of liberal democracy as though this form of democracy fits all circumstances. However since their proposals contain a qualitative leap, then questions arise regarding the quality of representation and relations between the representative and his constituency.

The question of the status of the representative was one of the preoccupations which engaged the minds and brains not only of Czech reformers but even in the most advanced liberal democracies. It has been said for example that in Britain: members of parliament are subject to a discipline which transforms them into voting-machines operated by party managers. They cannot vote against their party they cannot abstain they have no right to independent judgment on questions of substance and they know that if they fail to follow the party- line they can have no expectation of reelection. The one indispensable quality demanded of them, in short, is party loyalty.
The majority of them were of the view that under the prevailing conditions in Czechoslovakia at the time, the new representative had to be more than a mere delegate, a view that is in line with Cole’s position and indeed by Karl Marx on 19th Century France (Barraclough, 1967; Kar Max, 1966).  Like Cole, Klokocka, one of the leading Czech reformers maintained that without an area of freedom in which a representative could act independently, there would be no scope for a personal sense of political responsibility. If the representative was hamstrung as to render him incapable of doing anything, right or wrong, he could scarcely be held accountable for his actions. This conception of an independent representative fully accountable  for his action both to his constituency but also to his party would require considerable changes in intra-party organizational structures and the very conception of inner-party discipline especially in the conduct of parliamentary business (Banard & Vernon, 1976; Lenin, 1970).

From their argument, Czec reformers brought out in sharp relief the view that meaningful parliamentary democracy was inconceivable without meaningful elections. Although it was not maintained that political parties were the sole suitable instruments for political representation, it was held that they provided the best basis for making political choices between electoral contestants. Implied was the view that parties were not merely sectional interest groups but rather opinion groups which combined sectional elements with general global agendas. In other words, in the thinking of the reformers, parties provided the chance for expression of diversities within a consensual unity itself admittedly within the boundaries set by the constitution. Political parties were thus not identified with distinct classes or social strata, nor were they seen as dialectical opposites but as competing alternatives. The existence of competing alternatives, it was thought, would ensure that elections entailed uncertainties over their outcome, for elections without any risk were no elections at all (Locke, 1966).  different opinions were expressed on proliferation of political parties. There was however no significant support in favour of the multipartysm of the pre-war years. Multi-partysm under the new situation was not embrace as a sacred article of faith but rather as a minimal requirement that would help facilitate free contestation among a diversity of contesting view points, within a constitutionally defined socialist framework and to provide an opportunity for minorities to become majorities. And even if the pendulum did not swing that far, the pluralistically reformed system would at least give some substance to the slogan that the rule of the majority must express the will of the majority without of course muzzling the voices of the minority. So it has been put that while the majority expressing the will of the majority must have their day, the minority have the right to be heard (Laski, 2003; Vernon, 1975).

Most pluralist reformers viewed the proposed transformation as a logical development of a revolutionary process which had gone astray. They were in near unanimity in their view that like any major revolutionary process, the socialist revolution in Czechoslovakia required a radical restructuring of power relations in the course of its unfolding. Furthermore they were in agreement that revolutionary power-holders inevitably tend to weaken or destroy, through either containment, cooptation, blackmail or recourse to legal provisions for purposes of political harassment of existing autonomies in order to replace them with structures which are more amenable to effective control from the center. What the reformers refused to accept was the identification of a revolutionary transitional stage with the attainment of revolutionary socialist objectives. In other words, it may be argued, that given the revolution the development of socialism in Czechoslovakia could have proceeded along different lines. The Pattern of restructuring the revolutionary and post-revolutionary society was to them discontinuous with the purpose which gave legitimacy to the revolution in the first place why was this case?  
     
They advance three major arguments to support their claim. In the first place, instead of diffusing power horizontally, power was concentrated vertically. The atomization of society which followed in the wake of the revolution further facilitated this essentially bureaucratic process of power concentration. New ties of association and new norms of sustaining these ties had no chance of taking root thus foreclosing the possibility of the emergence of distinct autonomies. Secondly, the restructuring agent the communist party, itself was subjected to a process of strict verticalization, so that within the party microcosms the forces of decay and ossification were already at work albeit less vigorously than within the larger society. Thus instead of leading a revolution that would usher into an era of unprecedented freedom and democracy, the party itself lost the freedom and democracy it was to confer upon the rest of society. Thirdly the actual atomization that went along in society was disguised as an integrating process which culminated in a consensual unity, presumably comparable to that consensual unity which we witness at a church congregation.

In essence the unmasking task of the Czech pluralist socialist reformers could be viewed as initiating a process of political secularization, a process intended, should in succeed, to replace the instutionalized doctrine of a sacred Gemeinschaft with a counter doctrine of a secular Gessellschaft. This counter doctrine repudiated the consecration of politics implicit in the notion of consensual monism reminiscent of Rousseau’s identification of the body politic with that of a human ling and which endowed the supreme political being with a sacredness recalling his conception of the general will (Locke, 1966). In this respect, at any rate, the proposals of Czech reformers were at par with the aspirations of English Socialist pluralists early in the century. For it was Laski who had advanced the view that the modern state had assumed for itself the attributes and claims of a church and who regarded pluralism as fundamentally a deconsecration or demystification of political power (Laski, 1975). 

But this important similarity must not obscure no less significant contrasts. For Laski and the entire school of English pluralism rared in the tradition liberalism espoused by John Stuart Mill the demystification of politics implied its virtual elimination to bring to an end the imperative of a necessarily oppressive authority of political organization. But if you English School sought to liberate the diversity of society from state authority, the Czech reformers sought to achieve the same objective through pluralization of political relations. In Laski and Cole diversity understood as economic and social differentiation, existed within the framework of an assumed unity of political consciousness. In the thinking of Czech reformers, provision was made for attainment of diversity over the very terms of unity, that is, over the schedule of ends which were to be authoritatively enforced. For, to exclude such political diversity from the socialist vision was an invitation to the possibility of excluding meaningful political representation with risk that parliamentary sessions are reduced to fashion shows. 

There were no guidelines on how effective political representation could be guaranteed outside the framework provided by a socialist vision. Again writing on the predicament of the problem of representation, Marx had observed that although the peasants in France constituted an economic class, they were yet to acquire a consciousness that would enable them to constitute themselves into a class for themselves. They thus lacked political articulation and because of this they cannot represent themselves (Marx, 1963; McLellan, 1974; Milliband, 1977). Czech reformers found this comparable to the problem they were faced with. Here they argued, the whole nation constituted an economic class because all were employees of the State .But they too lacked political articulation. Their only common identity was that which had been imposed on them by a democratically non-representative body, the Communist party. Thus in their own estimation the nation was represented but did not represent itself (Wolff, 1968, Schumpeter, 1976).

Even if under socialism society is held together by having a single set of consistent interests and common uncontested system of beliefs, the problem of translating such global agenda into concrete actions remains. In coming to grips with this problem, some of the Czech reformers raised fundamental questions about the relations between belief and action; between theory and practice (Wolff, 1968, Schumpeter, 1976).  They also invite an appraisal of the meaning of political ideology as something distinct from a general belief system. It is in this distinction and its implied recognition of the possibility of internal ideological differentiation within a general belief system such as socialism that makes the Czech reform proposals significant for those who have not lost faith in the struggle for a socialist order. Equally significant is their complementary insistence on the provision of political modalities for the formation of an expression or articulation of such differences.
    
In the light of the foregoing, it might now have become clear that received models of pluralism for all and sundry are glaringly inadequate. In their identification of pluralism with a more or less determinate form of legal and social organization, English Socialism pluralist offered an essentially non-political model in which ideological divergence as opposed to functional differentiation could have no place. The same could be said about proposals from interest group school of America political science.

Such a model of pluralization while intended to be a reform model for socialist regimes is in fact perfectly compatible with a closed political model in which the belief system remains the preserve of the anointed ones, the ideological and intellectual gurus of socialist society. For such a system to be cognitively opened there must be political confrontation in which competing parties define their positions as practical formulations of universal beliefs. It does not suffice to take refuge behind a smokescreen of the existence of pressure groups both within and without the ruling party for evidence of pluralization of single party states.
   
The proposals of the English pluralist socialists and the Czech socialist pluralist different though they evidently are reopen the question of whether pluralism has some fundamental connection with liberalism. We feel that in both cases there is evidence to undermine the confidence that is strongly held about pluralism and its relation to liberalism. Phenomena that are usually associated with regimes that are labelled as being liberal- democracies are held to be inherently constitutive of liberalism as a political doctrine. If pluralism is supposed to mean interest-group competition and simultaneously such competition is taken to be definitive of liberal- democracy the relation between the two can be grasped. But nothing is served by this conflation which merely obscures the complexity of the pluralist tradition no less than that of the liberal one (Wolff, 1968, Schumpeter, 1976).  Some pluralist reformers held notion’s of community and group identity which are quire at odds with the fundamental individualism of the liberal school. We find among some liberal thinkers some measure of discomfort with regard to championing group interests. This discomfort in fact dovetails into a suspicion of groups as sources of potential instability which is entirely out of tune with pluralist thinking. And if liberalism is identified with the ideal of the limited state, some visions of pluralism such as the interest group model are indeed radically opposed to it.

The acceptance of public conflict as a feature of pluralism is also sometimes associated with liberal economic principles or with the idea of the market as an agency for democracy or perhaps as capitalism engenders democracy (Schumpeter, 1976).  This is surely misleading because the relation between units of exchange in a marker is quite different in the economic and political sphere. In the market place these units of exchange are commoditized and therefore become objects of value. In the latter whereas it s correct to speak of exchange of ideas, in the latter as units exchange ideas lose their value on the market so that there is no basis at all to speak of the free market of ideas (Ake, 1992; Seymour, 1959). The ideas lose their intrinsic value as ideas in the process of their transformation into commodities. 

Ideas can be challenged or defended, accepted or rejected, but they cannot be bought or traded. Secondly, commodities are competitive if they are identical or closely similar. Ideas on the other hand compete only if they are dissimilar. Thirdly the competition of commodities operates through the anonymous interaction of supply and demand in which competition of ideas on the other hand neither operates in this manner nor attains a point of equilibrium. Political competition as distinct from both economic competition and militant confrontation is not designed to be terminal.

Its significance lies not in providing solutions or resolutions but rather in providing alternative options. If therefore political competitions in analogous to economic competition it is only so in the rather limited sense of entailing rivalry and choice and while such superficial similarities help make the analogy plausible, they also help to conceal the much more important dissimilarities which substantively negate the analogy.
Our argument calls for reflection on the common sense, matter of fact view of economic competition which is sometimes overstretched to make it a necessary if indeed not a sufficient condition for the existence of political pluralism 56. In questioning the causal linkage between the economic and the political forms of competition we do not wish to deny the force of another suscipicion which frequently lurks behind the view that political competition is only feasible where there is economic competition. This consists of a reluctance to grant viability to political pluralism in a societal context is which the distinctiveness and autonomy of diverse organizations and institutions in constrained or otherwise foreclosed. It is therefore important to recall the emphasis placed on segmental autonomies advocated by English pluralists a possibility to which the Czech reformers were not blind to. Unlike their English counterparts Czech reformers did not confine the range of autonomous differentiation to social and economic autonomies, Czech reformers were inclined more to the belief that the very emergence of these social and economic autonomies was contingent upon the existence and continued existence of vigorous political modalities. And these modalities would in turn be significantly associated with on the basis pluralisation of ideological differentiation.    

If then liberal-democratic models are to be invoked within the context of the Czech reform paradigm for localization, the feature that invest comparison is the of a public conflict between diverse understandings of common good and not that of pragmatic bargaining in which only negotiable ends are at stake. Hitherto such conflict had seemed incompatible within socialist society. It is precisely in this respect that Czech pluralist ideas broke new ground. In the light of this it is no longer automatic that a socialist policy forecloses the possibility of public conflict over what is to be done in the political realm. The debate over what form of socialism under a pluralist political order must not be foreclosed and the Czech model provides a starting point, for reform minded Tanzanians. The constitution provides a framework for engaging our minds.
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